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Recent years have witnessed a growing unease with the use of the fiscal 
deficit to gauge the stance of economic policy.  Many economists as well as 
noneconomists are questioning whether a single number,  which relates primarily 
to the government's current cash flow,  is the kind of measure needed to under- 
stand the longer-term effects of fiscal policy on saving,  investment,  and 
growth.  They also ask whether the deficit can tell us how we are treating 
different generations,  both those currently alive and those yet to come. 
Economists and policymakers have long criticized the deficit for failing to 
account for inflation,  economic growth, government assets, and implicit 
liabilities.  Doubts about the deficit have been accentuated by the 
demographic transition occurring in most Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries.  The aging of populations,  with.its 
attendant increase in the number of retirees dependent on workers to fund 
their benefits,  raises major concerns about the viability of a short-run,  pay- 
as-you-go  approach to fiscal budgeting. 
In  recognition of these concerns about the demographic transition, the 
U.S. federal government decided in 1983 to accumulate a large Social Security 
trust fund to help finance the baby boom generation's Social Security 
benefits.  This decision represented a remarkable and highly praiseworthy 
break with short-term budgeting.  But it also raised new questions about using 
the unified federal deficit,  which includes Social Security,  as a measure of 
fiscal policy.  In  particular, it has provoked discussion about the goal of 
balancing the federal budget inclusive of Social Security.  If funds for 
future needs are to be accumulated,  shouldn't the United States be running a 
unified federa.1  budget surplus?  If so,  how large should it be?  And will such 
a policy reduce aggregate demand and depress the economy? 
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deficit as an instrument for long-term planning is to exclude Social Security 
from the federal deficit.  While this redefinition has formally occurred, it 
has not precluded the continued calculation of and attention paid to the 
unified budget deficit.  Indeed,  in its January 1991 report on the fiscal year 
1991 deficit,  the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) discussed not only the 
deficit inclusive of Social Security,  but three other deficits as well.  The 
CBO predicted 1) a total deficit of $360  billion (which excludes Social 
Security,  but includes the savings and loan [S&L] bailout),  2)  a Gram-Rudman 
deficit of $256 billion (which excludes Social Security and the S&L  bailout), 
3)  a National Income and Product Accounts deficit of $298 billion (which 
includes Social Security and the S&L  bailout),  and 4) a National Income and 
Product Accounts deficit of $194  billion (which includes Social Security and 
excludes the S&L  bailout).  The huge $166 billion difference between the 
largest and smallest of these numbers is roughly 3 percent of the predicted 
1991  U.S. gross national product (GNP). 
The proliferation of deficits, coming as it does after years of "smoke 
and mirrors" budget gimmickry (for example,  time-shifting of payments, moving 
some expenditure items off-budget, and making unrealistic economic assumptions 
in projecting future paths of revenues and expenditures) has taken its toll on 
public confidence in federal budgeting.  In a Time/CNN poll administered 
during the 1990 budget debate, 500 Americans were asked, "If the Bush Adminis- 
tration and Congress reach agreement on a deficit plan, do you expect a)  one 
that avoids the real issues or b)  a meaningful accord?"  Fully 70 percent of 
the respondents chose a). 
This paper discusses an alternative to the deficit -  generational 
accounting -  and its use in assessing fiscal policy,  particularly in regard 
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policies alter different generations' present expected values of their 
remaining lifetime net payments to the government.  According to the standard 
life-cycle theory, one's  lifetime present-value net payment, rather than one's 
immediate cash-flow payment to the government,  is the critical determinant of 
one's  consumption response to government policy.  From the perspective of the 
life cycle and other neoclassical consumption theories, the government's 
deficit does not properly measure policy-induced  stimuli to consumption. 
Indeed,  from a theoretical perspective, the measured deficit need bear no 
relationship to the underlying intergenerational stance of fiscal policy, 
since the deficit simply reflects the economically arbitrary labeling of 
government receipts and payments (Kotlikoff [1984,  19891 and Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff [1987]). 
The paper proceeds in the next section by pointing out that intergenera- 
tional redistribution is the central question underlying concern about the 
deficit.  It then provides examples of a range of policies in which the 
deficit fails to measure changes in generational burdens.  Section I1 
discusses the use of generational accounting to measure generational burdens 
directly.  Section I11 reports baseline U.S. generational accounts for 1989. 
It also examines four hypothetical policies to illustrate the ability of the 
new approach to keep track of changes in generational burdens.  While all four 
of the hypothetical policies effect major redistributions across generations, 
in the case of three of these policies, the deficit is completely unaffected. 
Section IV discusses the potential use of generational accounting for 
assessing the impact of fiscal policy on saving,  and section V concludes the 
paper. 
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The key economic question associated with fiscal deficits is,  Which 
generation will pay for what the government spends?  The answer to this 
question is obviously important for assessing generational equity,  but it is 
also central to the issues of national saving, investment,  and growth. 
Letting those of us currently alive off the hook in paying the government's 
bills permits us to consume more,  which lowers national saving.  Reduced 
national saving translates into reduced domestic investment,  which translates 
into slower growth in capital per worker,  which ultimately means slower growth 
in real wages.  Reduced national saving also leads to trade deficits as 
foreign savers help to finance domestic investment. 
Knowing which generations pay is also critical for stabilization  policy. 
Obviously,  reducing fiscal burdens on current generations at the price of 
increased burdens on future generations will stimulate current generations' 
demand for consumption.  In addition,  policies that redistribute toward older 
generations  will expand current consumption demand.  The reason is that older 
generations,  because they have fewer years left to live,  have higher 
propensities to consume their available resources than do younger generations 
(see Abel,  Bernheim, and Kotlikoff [1991]). 
Unfortunately, the federal deficit does not record a great deal of the 
government's generational policy.  Take,  for example,  the huge postwar buildup 
of pay-as-you-go  Social Security systems in the United States and in  most OECD 
countries.  As Feldstein (1974) first stressed,  this method of financing 
Social Security has transferred great sums of money to those generations who 
retired in the last four decades.  Much of the bill for that transfer was 
handed to young and middle-aged workers in the form of  high payroll taxes, and 
the rest of the bill will be paid by future generations,  who will likely face 
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chose to describe (label) Social Security contributions and benefit payments, 
this enormous intergenerational redistribution  had essentially no effect on 
reported fiscal deficits.  In the case of the United States,  had the govern- 
ment historically labeled contributions to Social Security as "loans" to the 
government,  rather than as "taxes,"  official U.S. debt would be more than 
three times its current level.' 
Another example of generational policy not captured by the deficit is a 
switch from income to consumption taxation that is "revenue neutral."  As 
first stressed by Summers (1981),  such balanced-budget policies can 
redistribute substantial sums from current elderly generations toward both 
current young and future generations.  The reason is that under a consumption 
tax,  the current elderly will pay substantially more taxes than they would 
under an income tax.  If the current elderly pay more and the government's 
consumption spending is not altered,  other generations will pay less.  2 
A third example is government policy that alters the market value of 
previously accumulated assets.  Consider the case of an investment incentive 
that lowers the market value of existing capital.  Since the elderly hold most 
of the existing capital,  this policy redistributes from the elderly to the 
middle-aged, young,  and future generations,  who are able to purchase the same 
Gross U.S. federal debt is currently about $3 trillion.  The Social 
Security Office of the Actuary reports that its closed-group unfunded 
liability is $7 trillion. 
2 
A partial switch from income to the equivalent of consumption taxation 
actually occurred in the United States from 1981 through 1986,  when the 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System of depreciation moved the effective tax 
structure away from income taxation toward consumption taxation. 
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redistribution does not show up on the government's books. 
A fourth example of generational policy missed by the deficit is a 
balanced-budget change in the structure of government transfer payments that 
pays for increased (reduced) transfer payments to the elderly,  by reducing 
(increasing) transfer payments to the young and middle-aged. 
A fifth example is preannounced policies that redistribute across genera- 
tions.  An example here is the 1983 U.S. legislation that reduced the prospec- 
tive Social Security benefits of  baby boomers by about one-fifth.  While this 
piece of legislation  had no impact on the 1983 deficit, it certainly 
represented very significant generational policy. 
These and other examples indicate that, as a measure of generational 
policy, the deficit's problems run  much deeper than is commonly believed.  One 
could correct the federal deficit for many things -  inflation,  growth,  the 
business cycle,  government assets,  and state and local surpluses -  and still 
end up with a measure of fiscal policy that misses pay-as-you-go  Social 
Security schemes,  revenue-neutral changes in the tax and transfer structure, 
policies that redistribute through asset markets, and policies that are pre- 
announced.  As discussed in  Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987),  the detrimental 
saving,  investment,  and growth effects of generational policies missed by the 
deficit can be many times larger than those generational policies, such as tax 
cuts,  that show up in the deficit.  Indeed,  as Kotlikoff (1989) points out, 
ignoring incentive effects,  generational policies that differ in their impact 
on reported deficits are intrinsically identical and really represent the same 
generic policy being described with different words. 
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A. How Should We Measure Generational Policve 
Economic theory suggests we should measure the government's generational 
policies with generational accounts.  These accounts indicate in present value 
what the typical member of each generation can expect,  on  net, to pay to the 
government now and in the future.  A generational account is thus a set of 
numbers, one for each existing generation, indicating the average remaining 
lifetime burden imposed by the government on members of the generation.  The 
proper use of these accounts leads to an assessment of generational policy 
that is independent of the words the government uses to label its receipts and 
payments. 
Generational accounts indicate not only what existing generations will 
pay,  but also the likely payments required of future generations.  The burden 
on future generations is determined by working through the government's inter- 
temporal budget constraint.  This constraint says that the present value of 
the government's  spending on goods and services cannot exceed the sum of three 
terms: 1)  the government's net wealth, 2)  the present value of net payments by 
current generations (the sum of the generational accounts multiplied by the 
number of people in each generation),  and 3)  the present value of net payments 
of future generations.  In  other words, the government  must ultimately pay for 
its spending  with its current assets or with resources obtained from current 
and future generations.  At any point in time,  we can project the present 
value of the government's spending and also estimate terms 1) and 2).  By 
subtracting 1) and 2)  from the present value of government spending,  we can 
determine the aggregate present-value burden on future generations. 
How will the total burden on all future generations be distributed over 
the different generations showing up in the future?  No one knows for sure. 
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such that each new generation's burden keeps pace with the economy's rate of 
productivity growth.  Then,  knowing the total amount that future generations 
will pay and projecting the number of people that will be born in the future, 
one can determine the growth-adjusted burden per capita (generational  account) 
on future generations. 
B. The Simple Mathematics of Generational ~ccountin~~ 
To make the above description of generational accounting more precise, we 
write the government's intertemporal  budget constraint for year t in equation 
(1) : 
D  OD  Q  s 
(1)  Nt,  t-s  +  Nt,  t+s 
1  -  w:+  XG II  -. 
S=O  s=l  s-t  j=t+l(l+rj 
The first term on the left-hand side of (1)  adds the present value of the net 
payments of all generations alive at time t.  Net payments refers to all taxes 
paid to the government (federal, state and local) less all transfers received 
from the government.  The expression N  stands for the time t present value  t  ,  k 
of remaining lifetime net payments of the generation born in year k.  The 
index s in this summation runs from age 0  to age D,  the maximum age of life. 
The first element of this summation is Nt,t,  which is the present value of net 
payments of the generation born in year t;  the last term is Nt,t-D, the 
present value of remaining net payments of the oldest generation alive in year 
t,  namely those born in year t-D.  The second term on the left-hand side of 
3 
The remainder of this section draws heavily on Auerbach, Gokhale, and 
Kotlikoff (1991). 
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The right-hand  side consists of wgt, the government's  (federal, state, and 
local) net wealth in  year t,  plus the present value of government consumption. 
In the latter expression, Gs stands for government consumption expenditure in 
year s, and r  stands for the pre-tax  rate of return in year j. 
j 
Equation (1) indicates the zero-sum  nature of intergenerational fiscal 
policy.  Holding the right-hand  side of the equation fixed, an increase 
(decrease) in government payments to (receipts taken from) existing genera- 
tions means a decrease in the first term on the left-hand  side of (1) and 
requires an offsetting increase in the second term on the left-hand  side of 
(1);  i.e.,  it requires reduced payments to, or increased payments from, future 
generations. 
The term Nt,  is defined in  equation (2)  : 
- 
In  this expression, Ts,k stands for the projected average net payment to the 
government made in  year s by a member of the generation born in year k.  By a 
generation's  average net payment in year s,  we mean the average across all 
members of the generation alive in year s of payments made, such as income, 
payroll, and consumption taxes, less all transfers received, such as Social 
Security, welfare, and unemployment  insurance.  The term Ps,k stands for the 
number of surviving members of the cohort in year s who were born in  year k. 
For generations who are born prior to year t, the summation begins in  year t. 
For generations who are born in year k,  where k>t, the summation begins in 
year k.  Regardless of the generation's  year of birth, the discounting is 
always back to year t. 
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by Pt,k (the generation's  current population size in the case of existing 
generations, or initial population size in the case of future generations), 
with the property that the combined total value of the N  's adds up to the  t,k 
right-hand side of equation (1).  In our calculation of the Nt,k's for 
existing generations (those whose k I  1989), we distinguish male from female 
cohorts,  but to ease notation,  we did not append sex subscripts to the terms 
in (1)  and (2). 
C. Assessing the Intereenerational Stance of Fiscal Policy 
Given the right-hand side and the first term on the left-hand side of 
equation (I), the value of the second term on the right-hand side,  which is 
the present value of payments required of future generations,  can be 
determined as a residual.  One can further determine the amount that needs to 
be taken from each successive generation to balance the government's inter- 
temporal budget, assuming that each successive generation's payment is the 
same up to an adjustment for growth. 
Understanding the size of the N  's for current generations and their  t  ,  k 
likely magnitude for future generations certainly does not fully reveal the 
intergenerational incidence of fiscal policy.  As studied in  Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987),  intergenerational  redistribution (changes in generational 
accounts) will alter the time path of factor prices, which has additional 
effects on the intergenerational distribution of welfare.  Such changes in 
factor prices result from changes in the supply of capital relative to labor. 
But the policy-induced changes in the supplies of capital and labor can,  in 
turn,  be traced back to changes in consumption and labor supply decisions that 
reflect changes in generational accounts.  Hence,  knowing how generational 
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the direct generational welfare effects of government policy,  but also the 
indirect (though not necessarily smaller) effects associated with factor price 
changes. 
D. Advanta~es  of Generational Accountinq 
Generational accounting automatically deals with each of the major 
concerns raised by those who think the deficit is conceptually sound,  but 
simply needs to be adjusted.  It deals with inflation by measuring all 
payments and receipts in inflation-adjusted (constant) dollars.  It nets all 
of the government's real assets against all of its real liabilities (such as 
the S&L  bailout) to form the value of government net worth,  which is 
ultimately used to help determine the burden on future generations.  It 
directly considers the government's  implicit obligations to make future 
transfer payments and to undertake future consumption spending,  and also 
considers the public's  implicit obligations to pay future taxes.  It accounts 
for state,  local,  and federal government fiscal policy.  By using replacement- 
cost valuation of assets,  it accounts for government redistribution through 
asset markets.  Finally, in projecting transfers, spending, taxes, and the 
implied burden on future generations through time, generational accounting 
deals with the question of economic growth,  including growth associated with 
demographic change. 
111. Illustrating Generational Accounting 
A. U.S.  Generational Accounts,  as of 1989 
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate generational accounting for the United States 
based on policy as of 1989 (prior.  to the 1990  budget agreement).  They are 
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which contains all of the details on the data used to form these tables.  The 
tables indicate, first,  each age-sex  group's  generational account.  Second, 
they provide a decomposition of each age-sex group's  generational account into 
the different present-value taxes and transfers that are netted against each 
other to form the generational account.  Third,  at the bottom of each table, 
they indicate the implied burden on future generations based on our illustra- 
tive assumptions that policy toward current generations remains unchanged and 
that the lifetime bill facing each new future generation is identical except 
for an adjustment for growth.  As discussed below, there are other ways to use 
generational accounting to document the imbalance in generational policy. 
Here,  we assess the burden on typical members of future generations under the 
assumption that current generations will be treated no better or worse in 
future  years than can  be predicted based on  current policy. 
In  looking at the accounts, one should keep in mind that they are 
forward-looking; they do not consider net payments that particular generations 
made in the past.  The generational accounts are not total lifetime bills,  but 
rather remaining lifetime bills.  This explains why the accounts are positive 
for young and middle-aged  generations,  but negative for older generations. 
Through the rest of their lives,  young and middle-aged Americans can expect, 
on  balance, to pay money to the government,  whereas older Americans can 
expect,  on balance, to receive money from the government. 
Compare,  for example, the $176,200  average bill of 40-year-old  males with 
the negative $42,700  average bill of 70-year-old  males.  Males who are now age 
40 can  anticipate spending  many more years working and paying income and 
payroll taxes on their labor earnings (the Labor Income Taxes and FICA Taxes 
columns in tables 1  and 2).  While these males will receive some welfare and 
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later from Social Security,  including Medicare (the Old Age Survivors and 
Disability Insurance [OASDI]  plus Health Insurance [HI]  columns in the 
tables).  The substantial taxes that those now 40 years old will pay over the 
next 20 or so years have a larger present value than the substantial transfers 
they will receive during the 20 or so years after they retire.  The present 
value of Social Security retirement and disability benefits for 40-year-old 
males,  which is the transfer component with the largest present value, is 
$21,900. But this figure is less than a third of their projected average 
present-value payroll tax payment of $65,100. 
For 70-year-old males, the story is quite different:  They are generally 
retired and are already receiving substantial Social Security retirement and 
Medicare benefits.  On average, the present value of the ongoing benefits of 
these males exceeds the present value of their remaining tax payments.  For 
70-year-old  males, Social Security and Medicare benefits together have a 
present value of $91,500,  while the present value of capital income taxes, 
which is the tax with the largest present value, is only $29,300. 
B. The Relative Burden on Future Generations 
Tables 1 and 2 indicate that as of 1989,  U.S. fiscal policy was out of 
generational balance in the sense that the burden on  both future male and 
female generations was about 21 percent larger than that on male and female 
newborns in 1989.  The equal size of the male and female differentials is no 
accident;  this equivalent-percentage treatment of future males and females was 
assumed for purposes of describing the imbalance in generational policy.  What 
exactly does it mean that future American newborns will pay a larger tab, even 
after adjusting for growth, than that being handed today's American newborns? 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmIt means that individuals alive today, including today's  newborns,  aren't 
slated to pay enough to keep the fiscal burden on future generations from 
rising. 
If  we spread the burden proportionately across everyone who comes along 
in the future,  it means that,  even after taking growth into account,  future 
generations will all pay 21 percent more than current newborns in net tax 
payments over their lifetimes.  What does "adjusted for growth" mean?  Suppose 
the economy's  growth rate of output per worker is 1 percent per year.  Then 
the payment scenario being discussed means that next year's newborn will pay 1 
percent more than this year's newborn because of growth and 20 percent more 
because of the imbalance of fiscal policy.  The following year's newbornwill 
pay 2 percent more because of growth and 20 percent more because of the 
imbalance of policy,  and so on. 
What if the U.S. government doesn't  immediately start requiring succes- 
sive new generations to pay more -  indeed, 21 percent more than the addi- 
tional amount they will pay because of growth?  What if,  for example, the 
government waits 10  years before increasing the lifetime net payments of new 
generations?  Then generational accounting 10 years from now will reveal that 
the 21 percent figure has grown to 35 percent (not shown in the table).  And 
if the U.S. government waits 20 years to start extracting more from future 
generations, those born in 2010 and thereafter will face a growth-adjusted 
burden that is 57 percent larger than that on newborns in 2009.  This is the 
zero-sum nature of generational accounting.  If Americans alive now do not pay 
more, and if the U.S. government does not make those born in the near future 
pay more, it will have to extract a much more substantial sum from those who 
are born in years thereafter. 
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Policy 
What would it cost Americans now alive to keep future Americans from 
paying a bigger share of their lifetime incomes to the government than the 
share current newborns are scheduled to pay?  One way to answer this question 
is to calculate the size of the immediate and permanent increase in income or 
other tax rates that would equalize the burden on current and future newborns. 
For example,  an immediate increase in consumption tax rates would make almost 
everyone who is currently alive pay more,  not only those who have just been 
born. 
If the United States chose to raise income tax rates immediately and 
permanently, the required increase in the average rate would be 5.3  percent, 
which would raise the average rate from 14.5 percent to 15.3 percent  .4  This 
assumes that state and local, as well as federal,  income taxes would be 
increased.  Simply raising federal income taxes to equalize generational 
burdens necessitates a 6.5  percent increase in the average federal income tax 
rate.  5 
If,  instead, the United States eliminated the extra burden on future 
generations by immediately and permanently raising payroll taxes, these taxes 
would have to rise by 7.8  percent, with the 12.8 percent average tax rate 
increasing to 13.8 percent.  Alternatively,  average sales/excise tax rates 
The average rate here is defined as all federal, state,  and local 
income taxes divided by net national product (NNP).  The data are from 1989. 
5 
The average federal income tax rate is 11.8 percent for 1989.  It is 
measured as federal labor plus capital income taxes divided by NNP. 
6 
The average payroll tax rate is defined as total federal,  state,  and 
local payroll taxes divided by total U.S. labor income.  The data are from 
1989. 
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percent rate to an 11.6 percent rate.7  Finally,  if the United States chose to 
raise capital income taxes immediately and permanently, the average capital 
income tax rate would climb by 14.3 percent, from a rate of 25.1 percent to a 
rate of 28.7 percent.  8 
Each of these different methods of achieving generational balance 
produces different tax receipts and different deficits this year and through 
time.  This is just one more indication that generational balance and budget 
balance bear no intrinsic relation.  The largest increase in immediate annual 
revenue -  $37 billion -  would arise in the case of payroll taxation,  and the 
smallest increase -  $33 billion -  would occur if capital income taxation 
were used.  9 
Permanently raising average tax rates,  regardless of which ones,  means 
that future generations will pay these higher taxes as well.  If income taxes 
The average sales/excise  tax is defined as total federal,  state,  and 
local indirect business taxes divided by U.S. personal consumption expendi- 
ture.  All data used in the calculation  are from 1989. 
8 
The average capital income tax rate is measured as total federal, 
state,  and local capital income tax revenue divided by total U.S. capital 
income.  All data are from 1989. 
9 
Compared with increasing payroll taxes, increasing capital income taxes 
makes the current elderly also pay to help correct the generational policy 
imbalance.  For a given amount of additional annual revenue,  the present value 
of the payments of all current generations combined is larger under the 
capital income tax than under the payroll tax.  Raising the capital income tax 
raises the current elderly's  present-value projected net tax payments, but 
also increases the projected present-value net payments of the current young 
and middle-aged, who will pay these higher capital income taxes in the future. 
Thus,  one can collect fewer dollars from the capital income tax and still 
equalize generational burdens because each dollar raised under the capital 
income tax does double duty in raising the present value of net payments of 
those currently alive. 
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equalizing value is $76,089.  It is $76,350  for the payroll tax, $76,576  for 
the sales/excise  tax,  and $75,641  for the capital income tax.  Even the 
largest of these four figures is only 4  percent larger than the $73,716  that 
today's newborns will pay under current policy.  Hence, if individuals 
currently alive pay a bit more now,  one can eliminate the need for future 
Americans to pay a lot more later. 
Table 3 indicates  how much more existing and subsequent generations will 
pay under the four different approaches to equalizing generational burdens. 
The numbers are present values and are in thousands of dollars.  The required 
payments are not staggeringly large,  but neither are they trivial.  Consider 
an increase in the income tax.  For a middle-aged female,  the increase in her 
generational account is about $2,500.  For a middle-aged male, the additional 
present-value bill averages about $5,300. With the exception of the very old, 
who pay about $200 more, raising the income tax would represent a substantial 
loss to those currently alive,  with the biggest absolute burden falling on 
baby boomers.  However,  compared with the costs to current generations, the 
gains to future generations are quite substantial.  By paying for more of the 
government's  spending,  current generations would, in the case of an income tax 
increase,  lower the projected burdens on future males (females) by a growth- 
adjusted $13,500  ($6,600). 
The additional burden placed on different generations can vary consider- 
ably when one type of tax increase is substituted  by another.  For example, 
under the payroll tax increase,  70-year-old  males pay only $300 more on 
average,  while under the capital income tax increase, they pay an additional 
$2,700.  The choice of taxes also determines how the burden is split between 
males and females.  If the sales/excise  tax is increased, the additional bills 
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large as those faced by current males of the same age.  The reason is that 
U.S. females pay proportionately more in sales and excise taxes than they do 
in income and payroll taxes. 
D. Using Generational Accounts -  A Word of Caution 
The usefulness of generational accounts is in comparing their values 
before and after a particular policy change and in comparing the burden on 
future generations (the last row in tables 1-4)  with the burden on the 
youngest members of current generations, namely newborns.  These comparisons, 
rather than the initial level of the accounts, should be the focus of 
attention. 
The reason to focus on policy-induced changes in the accounts and on 
comparisons of future generations with current newborns is that such analyses 
are not sensitive to the choice of labels attached to government receipts and 
payments.  In  contrast,  the initial levels of the accounts (with the exception 
of the accounts for newborns and future generations) are sensitive to the 
choice of accounting labels.  To understand this point,  consider again the 
negative $42,700  account of 70-year-old males.  Now think how much larger 
(less negative) that number would be had the government historically called 
Social Security contributions "loansn  rather than "taxesn  and Social Security 
benefits "repayment of principal plus interest on the loansn  plus an "old-age 
tax,"  where the old-age tax adjusts for the fact that benefits may not 
precisely equal principal plus interest on contributions.  With this alterna- 
tive language,  the 70-year-old's  generational account today would be a lot 
larger (a lot less negative);  it would exclude the $61,900  in present value of 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmSocial Security (OASDI) benefits indicated in table 1,  and it would include 
the present value of the old-age tax. 
E. Using Generational  Accounting to Detect Generational Policv 
Table 4  considers four hypothetical policies, each of which has a 
significant impact on the U.S. generational distribution of fiscal burdens. 
The first of these policies is the only one that alters the U.S. federal 
deficit.  This policy (reported in column 1)  is a five-year, 20 percent reduc- 
tion in the average federal income tax rate.  At the end of the tax cut,  the 
tax rate is increased above its initial value in order to maintain constant 
the ratio of U.S. debt (including the newly accumulated government debt) to 
GNP; i.e.,  the tax rate increase is sufficient to cover the product of the 
interest rate less the growth rate, times the additional accumulated stock of 
government debt  . 
The second policy, reported in column 2,  is an immediate and permanent 20 
percent increase in Social Security retirement and disability benefits 
financed on a pay-as-you-go  basis by increases in payroll taxes.  The third 
policy, reported in column 3,  involves an equal revenue switch in the tax 
structure.  Specifically,  payroll taxes are reduced immediately and 
permanently by 30 percent, and the reduced revenue is made up by increases in 
consumption taxes,  which, in the U.S. context,  means increases in sales and 
excise taxes. 
The fourth policy, reported in column 4,  involves the elimination of U.S. 
investment incentives.  By this we mean a present-value, revenue-neutral 
equalization of effective tax rates on assets of different vintages.  To 
understand how this policy alters the generational accounts,  we need to 
clarify the treatment of investment incentives in our generational accounting. 
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from the availability of investment incentives for new capital, is treated as 
a one-time tax paid by the current owners of this existing capital; i.e., 
rather than valuing this capital at market prices, we value it at replacement 
cost less a tax discount.  The elimination of investment incentives is then 
treated as 1)  the elimination of this one-time tax discount (as opposed to 
treating it/labeling it as a capital gain) and 2)  an increase in the effective 
capital income tax rate necessary to offset,  in present value, this one-time 
windfall. In the first year,  this requires an increase in aggregate capital 
income taxes equal to the product of the interest rate less the growth rate 
times the initial tax discount on existing capital.  Subsequent-year increases 
in capital income taxes equal the first-year increase times the appropriate 
growth factor. 
The results of these policy experiments point out several issues.  First, 
the magnitude and pattern of intergenerational  redistribution bears no neces- 
sary relation to the reported deficit.  The tax-cut policy of column 1 gener- 
ates more than $750 billion of official debt,  but does substantially less 
damage to the young and future generations than the pay-as-you-go  Social 
Security benefit increase in column 2,  which leads to zero increase in 
official debt.  For instance,  under the tax-cut policy, 20-year-old  males 
lose,  on average, $2,200  in present value.  Under the Social Security benefit 
increase policy, they lose $5,500,  which is more than two-and-a-half  times as 
much. 
Second,  some policies that redistribute to current older generations do 
so primarily to the detriment of current young generations, but do not affect 
future generations by much.  Column 4,  involving the elimination of investment 
incentives,  illustrates this point.  This policy does most of its damage to 
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is only $200,  while 20-year-old  males lose $2,300.  Of course,  policies that 
just redistribute from the current young to the current elderly could also end 
up hurting future generations if these policies are reactivated during the 
years such generations are young. 
Third,  by using generational policies that don't  show up in the official 
deficit,  one can easily offset the generational impact of policies that do. 
For example, the generational impacts of the tax cut of column 1 can be 
overcome by running the reverse of the policy in column 4,  i.e., by 
increasing,  rather than decreasing, investment incentives and thereby 
reversing the sign of all the numbers in column 4. 
Fourth, since changes in consumption decisions depend, according to the 
life-cycle model, on changes in each generation's total projected lifetime 
payments,  generational accounting such as that in table 4  indicates the true 
stimulus to national consumption of policy changes.  In contrast,  as the 
examples in table 4  show,  the deficit need bear no relationship to the 
underlying stimulus to consumption.  Thus,  generational accounting,  rather 
than the deficit,  provides the proper guide for stabilizing the economy and 
assessing the impact of policy on saving. 
IV. Using Generational Accounting to Assess Policy-Induced Changes in Saving 
Changes in national saving can be traced to changes in national income 
and in  national consumption.  While additional work is needed to connect 
changes in generational accounts to changes in national income,  we are able to 
assess the income effects of policy changes on national consumption by multi- 
plying changes in the generational accounts by generation-specific 
propensities to consume.  This analysis abstracts from the incentive effects 
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tant for labor supply decisions as well as for intertemporal consumption 
choice.  Such incentive effects would, in our framework,  be captured as 
changes in the propensities to work and consume from lifetime resources. 
Unfortunately, at this time there are available only initial estimates of 
propensities to consume by age and sex,  but no indication of how these 
propensities respond to changes in the structure of incentives.  Another 
caveat involves the issue of uncertainty.  The appropriate propensities to 
consume in the case of policies that accentuate economic uncertainty will, 
presumably,  be smaller than those in the case of policies that reduce 
uncertainty.  In this analysis we ignore both incentive issues and 
uncertainty. 
The age- and sex-specific consumption propensities used here were calcu- 
lated based on data compiled in Abel, Bernheim, and Kotlikoff (1991).  Their 
study uses the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure Survey 
for the years 1981 to 1986 to determine households' propensities to consume 
out of household lifetime income according to the age of the household head. 
In the course of that study,  the authors estimated the human wealth,  nonhuman 
wealth, Social Security wealth, and pension wealth of surveyed adults. 
For purposes of this study,  we formed the average ratio of consumption to 
lifetime income (the sum of human wealth, nonhuman wealth, Social Security 
wealth, and pension wealth) by age and sex for adult generations.  In these 
calculations,  we ascribe to parents the consumption expenditures of their 
children living at home. In the case of married parents,  we ascribe half of 
the children's consumption to the husband and half to the wife.  For purposes 
of this calculation,  we exclude observations on households in which individ- 
uals other than children reside with the household head.  The consumption 
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to that individual.  The remaining household consumption expenditures are 
divided evenly between the husband and wife. 
Table 5 reports the weighted-average ratios of consumption to the present 
value of lifetime income by age and sex arising between the fifth and sixth 
deciles of the distribution of lifetime income.  We use these consumption 
propensities to determine the first-year impact on  U.S. consumption and saving 
of the four hypothetical policies of table 4.  Specifically, for each policy 
we multiply the changes in generational accounts for each age-sex group by the 
number of individuals in that group times the group's  consumption propensity. 
The sum of these numbers across all age-sex  groups gives the policy's  first- 
year impact on U.S. consumption.  We then recalculate the U.S. net national 
saving rate for 1989 based on each of the four policies.  The actual 1989 U.S. 
net national saving rate was 3.67 percent.  Under the tax-cut policy, the 
saving rate falls to 3.24  percent.  It is 2.76 percent for the pay-as-you-go 
Social Security policy, 3.73 percent for the shift from payroll to consumption 
taxation,  and 3.44 percent for the elimination of investment incentives. 
Of the four hypothetical policies, the 20-percent increase in unfunded 
Social Security benefits has the largest first-year  impact on national saving, 
reducing the saving rate by almost one quarter.  The 0.91  percent initial-year 
drop in the saving rate is of the same order of magnitude as the saving-rate 
decline reported in Auerbach and Kotlikoff's  (1987)  simulation analysis of 
unfunded Social Security. 
In comparison  with the saving decline from the Social Security experi- 
ment, the decline in  national saving arising from the five-year income tax cut 
is less than half as large.  Part of the explanation for the smaller impact 
is,  as indicated above, that the generational impact of this policy is 
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part of the explanation is that we are considering  here only the income 
effects of these policies on saving;  i.e.,  we are ignoring substitution 
effects.  Finally, the results here ignore general equilibrium changes in 
factor prices that,  when anticipated,  could influence even the initial-year 
impact of policy changes on saving. 
As predicted by Summers (1981),  a partial shift from wage to explicit 
consumption taxation does increase the national saving rate,  but the increase 
reported here is modest.  The elimination of implicit consumption taxation 
arising from the removal of investment incentives has a somewhat larger effect 
on national saving. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper explores the use of generational accounting in understanding 
the intergenerational redistribution arising from alternative fiscal policies. 
It  also demonstrates how one can  use policy-induced changes in generational 
accounting to consider the impact of policy changes on national saving.  The 
findings confirm what many economists have long suspected:  The fiscal deficit 
is thoroughly unreliable as a measure either of generational policy or of the 
policy-induced stimulus to aggregate demand.  The findings also suggest that 
fiscal policies of the type actually conducted by OECD countries in the 
postwar period could have important effects on OECD national saving rates. 
The results discussed here should,  however,  be viewed as preliminary. 
Many refinements of generational accounting need to be implemented.  In 
addition,  the analysis of average consumption propensities should be improved 
and extended to the consideration of marginal consumption  propensities. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFinally, the sensitivity of the findings to alternative growth- and interest- 
rate assumptions deserves careful exploration. 
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The  Conposition of  Male Generational Accounts  (r=.06,  g=.0075) 
Present  Values  of Receipts and Payments 
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Payments  Receipts 
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Age  in  1989  PaynMt  Taxes  Taxes  Taxes  Taxes  rage  Taxes  OASDI  HI  AFDC  General  UI  St- 
Future 
Generations  89.5 
Source:  Authors1  calculations 
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The  Composition of Female Generational Accounts  (r=.06,  g=.0075) 
Generation's  Net 
Age  in  1989  Payment 
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Payments  Receipts 
Labor  Capital 
lncome  FICA  Excise  Income  Seigno-  Property  Welfare  Food 
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